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Children’s Trust in Previously Inaccurate Informants Who Were Well or Poorly
Informed: When Past Errors Can Be Excused
Erika Nurmsoo and Elizabeth J. Robinson
University of Warwick
Past research demonstrates that children learn from a previously accurate speaker rather than from a previously
inaccurate one. This study shows that children do not necessarily treat a previously inaccurate speaker as
unreliable. Rather, they appropriately excuse past inaccuracy arising from the speaker’s limited information
access. Children (N5 67) aged 3, 4, and 5 years aimed to identify a hidden toy in collaboration with a puppet as
informant. When the puppet had previously been inaccurate despite having full information, children tended to
ignore what they were told and guess for themselves: They treated the puppet as unreliable in the longer term.
However, children more frequently believed a currently well-informed puppet whose past inaccuracies arose
legitimately from inadequate information access.
Much of our knowledge about the world is gained
indirectly from what other people tell us, rather than
from our own direct experience. This ability to learn
from others confers great advantages over animals
without language but carries with it associated risks:
Other people can deliberately deceive us, bemistaken,
or be misunderstood. If we are to benefit overall from
gaining knowledge from what other people say, we
need to manage these risks. Ideally, we would believe
what others tell us only when it is true. This suggests
that childrenneeda set of skills to assess the likely truth
of what they are told. Without such skills, they will be
vulnerable to believing what is false or disbelieving
what is true even if surrounded by people who intend
to be cooperative and informative.
One useful predictor of a speaker’s present reliabil-
ity is his or her past accuracy. A neighborwho has been
an accurate informant about garden pests in the past
will be invited to give her diagnosis of my current
problem. Another neighbor who previously offered
inaccurate diagnoses is less likely to be consulted
again. That is, accuracy of the speaker’s past output
is taken as a good predictor of current output, at least
within a particular domain of knowledge. Four-year-
olds, and 3-year-olds under some conditions, use this
cue to speaker reliability. In a naming game developed
independently by Koenig, Harris, and colleagues
(Koenig, Cle´ment, & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris,
2005; Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, &Harris, 2007) and
by Birch and Bloom (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008;
see also, Jaswal & Neely, 2006), children observe two
speakers name objects familiar to the child (e.g., a ball).
On each of three trials, one speaker names an object
accurately (‘‘ball’’) and the other names it inaccurately
(‘‘shoe’’). On subsequent test trials, the two speakers
offer different novel names for an unfamiliar object
(e.g., ‘‘mido,’’ ‘‘loma’’) or use the same novel name for
two different unfamiliar objects. Children are then
tested to find out which speaker’s name they accept.
Four-year-olds typically use the label given by the
speaker who had named familiar objects accurately,
whereas 3-year-olds do so only under certain condi-
tions (Koenig & Harris, 2005). These authors conclude
that children interpret the speaker’s history of inaccur-
acy in terms of a lasting trait: The speaker is treated as
an unreliable informant, at least within a particular
domain. Similarly, Birch et al. (2008) conclude that 3-
and 4-year-olds keep track of speakers’ histories of
being accurate or inaccurate and prefer to learn from
someone with a good track record.
However, adults do not necessarily interpret in-
accuracy as a sign that the speaker is unreliable in the
longer term. Suppose I gave my neighbor only the
briefest account of a pest infestation and encouraged
her to produce a diagnosis. It would not only be
unreasonable of me to dismiss her as unreliable if she
turned out to be wrong, I might also miss out on
accurate advice on a future occasionwhen shehad full
command of the facts. That is, when speaker inaccur-
acy can be explained in terms of the particular
circumstances under which it occurred, it may be
inappropriate to treat the speaker as an unreliable
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individual. Rather, the speaker is potentially reliable
when circumstances change.
Hence, while under some conditions, it is appro-
priate to attribute inaccuracy to the speaker’s lasting
unreliability and avoid learning from that speaker in
the future, under other conditions, it is more appro-
priate to attribute inaccuracy to the speaker’s partic-
ular circumstances and to believe that speaker’s future
utterances when those circumstances have changed.
We currently know rather little about how young
children interpret inaccuracy and whether they show
sensitivity to an inaccurate speaker’s circumstances.
What evidence there is suggests children aged 3–7
years ignore the reasons for past inaccuracy when
predicting future reliability. Nurmsoo and Robinson
(2008) developed a variation of the typical procedure
summarized above. In a game in which both speakers
were required to name objects, one speaker named
familiar objects inaccuratelywhile wearing a blindfold,
and a second speaker, who could see, either named the
same objects accurately or named them inaccurately for
no obvious reason. On test trials both speakers could
see an unfamiliar object and offered different labels.
When one speaker had a history of accuracy, children
endorsed the label offered by that speaker despite
understandingwhy thepreviouslyblindfoldedspeaker
had made errors. When both speakers were equally
inaccurate, children showed no preference for either
speaker’s label, again despite understanding why the
blindfolded speaker had erred. That is, contrary to the
example above concerning an inaccurate neighbor,
children in this research failed to take into account the
fact that past inaccuracy occurred due to particular
circumstances that no longer held: Errors made when
temporarily wearing a blindfold were not excused.
In the research just described (Nurmsoo&Robinson,
2008), the authors built on procedures developed to
examine children’s predictions based on a speaker’s
past history of accuracy or inaccuracy, inserting the
variable of the speaker’s access to relevant information.
In the research reported here, we did the opposite: We
built onprocedures inwhich young children are known
to take into account a speaker’s access to relevant
information and inserted the variable of speaker’s
history of accuracy or inaccuracy (Robinson, Haigh, &
Nurmsoo, 2008; Robinson & Whitcombe, 2003;
Whitcombe & Robinson, 2000). In Robinson and
Whitcombe’s procedure, children played a tunnel game
with the experimenter to identify, which one of a pair of
toys was hidden in a tunnel. Toys in a pair differed
either in color (e.g., a red or a blue cat) or hardness (e.g.,
a hard or a soft caterpillar), and the hidden target toy
could be felt through one end of the tunnel or seen
through a window in its side. When the target was
identified by color, for example, a player who saw it
could identify it reliably, whereas a player who felt it
could only guess. Children who had only uninforma-
tive access (e.g., felt a toy identified by color) weremore
likely to believewhat the experimenter told them about
the target’s identity when the experimenter had infor-
mativeaccess (saw the toy) thanwhen theexperimenter,
like the child, had only uninformative access (felt it).
In the present study, we compared children’s
readiness to believe two currently well-informed
speakers both with a history of three inaccuracies.
One speaker was inaccurate while poorly informed,
and the other erreddespite beingwell informed. There
was no obvious reason for the inaccuracy in the latter
case, as in Koenig and Harris (2005) and the many
similar studies listed earlier, and no signs that the
speaker was teasing or pretending, so children were
expected to treat the speaker asunreliable in the longer
term. Would children be more willing to believe the
speaker whose inaccuracy could be excused on
grounds of inadequate information access?
Method
Because our task involved a face-to-face game with
the child, we decided to use a puppet rather than an
adult as speaker in order to avoid the uncomfortable
and perhaps unacceptable situation of an apparently
fully informed adult giving obviously inaccurate
information to the child participant. In previous
research involving inaccurate but fully informed
speakers, children have either watched adults on
video or puppets have been used.
Participants
Participants were 31 children (19 girls) from nurs-
ery classes, aged 3.9 – 4.7 (M 5 4.2) and 36 children
(17 girls) in their 1st year of formal schooling (U.K.
reception classes) aged 4.10 – 6.8 (M 5 5.1). The
children attended schools serving predominantly
White working and middle-class areas of Warwick-
shire and the West Midlands regions of the United
Kingdom.
Materials
We used a tunnel with a curtain at the end through
which the child could insert an arm, and a curtained
window in one side through which the child could
look. Seven pairs of toys were used: two pairs of
worms for warm-up trials, one pair differing only in
color and the other only in hardness; three pairs of
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animals for history trials; and two pairs for test trials.
The animal pairs were drawn from a set including
three pairs of bears (black and brown, blue and green,
and white and brown) and pairs of ducklings, lady-
birds, and elephants (all differing only in hardness). A
monkey hand puppet was used, which had arms and
hands, so it could be shown to feel inside the tunnel.
Design and Procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet corri-
dor or corner of their school classroom. The procedure
was heavily based on one developed previously (e.g.,
Robinson & Whitcombe, 2003; Robinson et al., 2008).
On each of two warm-up trials, children saw and felt
the two toys in a pair and agreed on their properties.
The experimenter slipped one of the toys in secret into
the tunnel. Children practiced looking at and feeling
it. They were told explicitly that feeling was insuffi-
cient when the target toy was identified by color and
that looking was necessary. Similarly, they were told
explicitly that looking was insufficient for a toy iden-
tified by hardness and that feeling was necessary.
After the two warm-up trials, children had three
history trials followed by two test trials. The purpose
of the history trials was to give children experience of
the puppet’s inaccuracy. The toy pairs were ordered
such that each child alternated feeling and seeing on
sequential trials. Half the children started by feeling
and half started by seeing. Children were randomly
assigned to thePuppetUninformed andPuppet Informed
conditions. These conditions differed in the history
trials but had identical test trials.
In the puppet uninformed condition, participants
witnessed the puppet make three sequential errors
while poorly informed. On each of the three history
trials, thepuppethad access first: It tookuninformative
access (e.g., it felt a toy identified by color) and said ‘‘I’ll
say which one I think it is. The (blue) one,’’ identifying
the target toy incorrectly. The child then had informa-
tive access (e.g., saw the toy identified by color) and
was asked by the experimenter which toy was in the
tunnel. As expected, children relied on their own
informative access to identify the toy correctly.
An important feature of the procedure was that the
game required child and experimenter to take turns to
saywhich toy they thought was in the tunnel whether
they had informative or uninformative access. There
was therefore no reason to construe the puppet in the
puppet uninformed condition as untrustworthy for
offering a suggestion despite being poorly informed.
The puppet informed condition was the same
except that on all three history trials, the puppet had
informative access (seeing a target identified by color
or feeling a target identified by hardness) before
giving the wrong judgment. The child then had the
same informative access and had the opportunity to
give the correct judgment.
Two test trials followed immediately. As on the
history trials, children agreed on the properties of
the two toys in a pair, and one was hidden inside the
tunnel. On test trials, however, children had access
first: They had uninformative access to the target toy,
saidwhichone they thought itwas (e.g. ‘‘Thehardone’’
having only seen it), and then the puppet had infor-
mative access and contradicted the child (‘‘The soft
one,’’ having felt it). Finally, the experimenter asked the
child which the target was (‘‘The hard one or the soft
one?’’). Children could either repeat their original
guess or switch to agree with the now well-informed
puppet. Regardless of whether the child guessed
correctly on test trials, the puppet gave a contradicting
judgment. Children were not given the opportunity to
check the accuracy of the puppet’s judgment on test
trials. The purpose of the test trials was to find out
whether or not children believed the puppet’s sugges-
tion when it was better informed than they were.
Results
There was no difference between the two age groups,
t(65) 5 1.29, p 5 .20, and so data were combined for
analysis. Table 1 shows the frequencies of children in
each conditionwhobelieved thewell-informedpuppet
on zero, one, and two test trials. Children in the puppet
informed condition performed no differently from
chance, v2(2, N 5 32) 5 4.5, p 5 .11; they behaved as
would be expected if they ignored what the puppet
said and simply guessed for themselves. In contrast,
71% of the children in the puppet uninformed condi-
tion believed the puppet’s suggestion on both test
trials.Childrenwere significantlymore likely tobelieve
the puppet’s suggestion when its inaccuracy was
excusable on the grounds of inadequate access to the
target than when it was not, t(65)5 3.19, p, .003, d5
0.78. These results suggest that children excused past
inaccuracy when the speaker had been poorly
informed but not when there was no such explanation.
Discussion
Wehave confirmed the published findings that young
children do not uncritically accept that whatever they
are told is true. They are not passive recipients of
testimony from others, but actively evaluate it when
deciding whether or not to believe it. One variable
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they attend to is speakers’ history of accuracy or
inaccuracy: As in the previous research, children in
the puppet informed condition predicted the reliabil-
ity of a speaker’s current output on the basis of his or
her previous output.
Our tasks differed in several potentially important
respects from those used previously to assess child-
ren’s attention to speaker’s past accuracy (Birch et al.,
2008; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig & Harris, 2005;
Koenig et al., 2004; Nurmsoo&Robinson, 2008). First,
in those studies, children chosewhich of two speakers
to believe, one of whom was previously accurate and
the other inaccurate for no obvious reason. Children
consistently preferred the previously accurate
speaker. It could have been that the contrast between
speakers was important for directing children to the
relevance of past accuracy. This appears not to be the
case. Here, we show an effect of past accuracy in the
puppet informed conditionwhen childrenwere faced
with only a single well-informed speaker with a his-
tory of unexplained inaccuracy.
Second, in previous studies, children learned about
conventional, generalizable knowledge such as the
names or functions of unfamiliar objects (but see
Clement, Koenig, & Harris, 2004, who included items
on objects’ color). Csibra and Gergely (2005) argue
that infants and young children are sensitive to cues
that an adult is about to pass on generalizable
knowledge, whereas adults are particularly ready to
pass on their expertise in ways accessible to children.
It might have been that sensitivity to speakers’ history
of accuracy or inaccuracy was confined to such
knowledge, for which children are heavily dependent
on adult informants, and for which the costs of
learning something false may be high. However, our
findings show that children are also sensitive to
a speaker’s history of accuracy when informed about
the identity of a hidden target, nongeneralizable
knowledge about a particular event that the child
could easily have found out herself.
Third and most importantly, our results go beyond
those of previous research in showing that children do
not simply attend to the speaker’s history of accuracy
or inaccuracy but also pay attention to the reasons
for it. When they understood that the inaccuracy
occurred due to the particular circumstances at the
time, they appropriately did not predict that the
speaker would be unreliable when circumstances
changed. Children took into account speakers’ input
(their information access) to interpret the significance
of inaccurate output (what they said). This implies that
they engaged in mentalistic reasoning and did not
simply treat potential informants as theymight treat an
accurate or an inaccurate clock. Interestingly, both
Harris (2007) and Birch et al. (2008) argue that selective
trust in previously accurate speakers is based on
mentalistic reasoning, althoughhitherto there has been
no evidence to support that strong interpretation.
Indeed, there is evidence that children do not
engage inmentalistic reasoningwith procedures very
similar to those used by Harris and colleagues (e.g.,
Koenig & Harris, 2005) and by Birch et al. (2008): As
mentioned in the Introduction, Nurmsoo and
Robinson (2008) found that children did not excuse
a speakerwhose inaccurate naming of familiar objects
was due to the temporary wearing of a blindfold.
Faced with two speakers who offered contrasting
names for an unfamiliar object, one of whom had
previously labeled three familiar objects inaccurately
despite being able to see them, and the other of whom
had done the same while blindfolded, children
showed no preference for the label offered by the
previously blindfolded speaker (who could now see).
That is, children attended only to the accuracy of
a speaker’s previous output when deciding whether
or not to believe her current suggestion about the
name of an unfamiliar object; they did not take into
account the reason for the prior inaccuracy. Impor-
tantly, as in the procedure used in the experiment
reported here, the demands of the game meant that
the naming objects despite being blindfolded could
not be construed as foolish or irresponsible.
Nurmsoo and Robinson (2008) discuss possible
reasons for children’s failure to take into account the
reasons for speaker inaccuracy in the typical naming
task. Perhaps communicative and social cues neces-
sary to engage mentalistic reasoning are absent from
the typical procedure. Thismay be important to check
in further research because procedures of this kind are
Table 1
Incidence of Believing Puppet’s Suggestion on 0, 1, and 2










3 – 4 years
1 3 13
Reception,
4 – 5 years
3 3 12




3 – 4 years
4 4 6
Reception,
4 – 5 years
7 6 5
Total 11 10 11 1.00 (0.84)
26 Nurmsoo and Robinson
now widely used in investigations of children’s trust
in speakers, and it is possible that the findings have
limited relevance to children’s learning from others in
real life. A second possibility is that children are
particularly intolerant of speakers’ inaccuracy when
they learn generalizable knowledge such as the names
or functions of objects. That is, they may be overly
cautious and unwilling to excuse inaccuracy for any
reason rather than risk acquiring false generalizable
information. In contrast, when learning specific infor-
mation such as the identity of a hidden toy, as in the
task used here, theymayweight the benefit of gaining
new information more heavily and be less averse to
the risk of learning something false.
Whatever the reasons for the children’s failure to
take into account the reasons for speaker inaccuracy
in the typical naming game task, we have the clear
demonstration in this research that children aged 3 – 4
years can show appropriate balance between risking
believing an unreliable speaker and missing out on
learning from a speaker whose short-term circum-
stances led to inaccuracy.This is confirmed ina further
study (Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2007) in which children
were even prepared to abandon their well-founded
expectation about the contents of a box, and to believe
instead what they were told by a previously unreli-
able puppet, but only when the previous unreliability
could be excused in terms of limited information
access. Further research is needed to examine the
limits of this well-balanced behavior.
References
Birch, S. A. J., Vauthier, S. A., & Bloom, P. (2008). Three- and
four-year-olds spontaneously use others’ past perfor-
mance to guide their learning. Cognition, 107, 1018– 1034.
Clement, F., Koenig, M., & Harris, P. L. (2004). The
ontogenesis of trust. Mind and Language, 19, 360 – 379.
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2005). Social learning and social
cognition: The case for pedagogy. In M. H. Johnson &
Y. Munakatas (Eds.), Processes of change in brain and
cognitive development. Attention and performance XXI
(pp. 249 – 274). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Harris, P. L. (2007). Trust. Developmental Science, 10, 135 – 138.
Jaswal, V. K., & Neely, L. A. (2006). Adults don’t always
know best: Preschoolers use past reliability over age
when learning new words. Psychological Science, 17,
757 – 758.
Koenig, M. A., Clement, F., & Harris, P. L. (2004). Trust in
testimony: Children’s use of true and false statements.
Psychological Science, 15, 694 – 698.
Koenig, M. A., & Harris, P. L. (2005). Preschoolers mistrust
ignorant and inaccurate speakers. Child Development, 76,
1261 – 1277.
Nurmsoo, E., & Robinson, E. J. (2007, October). Children
trust speakers with a history of excusable inaccuracy. Poster
presented at meetings of the Cognitive Development
Society, Santa Fe, NM.
Nurmsoo, E., & Robinson, E. J. (2008). Identifying unreli-
able informants: Do children excuse past inaccuracy?
Developmental Science, 11, 905 – 911.
Pasquini, E. S., Corriveau, K. H., Koenig, M., & Harris, P. L.
(2007). Preschoolers monitor the relative accuracy of
informants. Developmental Psychology, 43, 1216 – 1226.
Robinson, E. J., Haigh, S. N., & Nurmsoo, E. (2008).
Children’s working understanding of knowledge sour-
ces: Confidence in knowledge gained from testimony.
Cognitive Development, 23, 105 – 118.
Robinson, E. J., & Whitcombe, E. L. (2003). Children’s
suggestibility in relation to their understanding about
sources of knowledge. Child Development, 74, 48 – 62.
Whitcombe, E. L., & Robinson, E. J. (2000). Children’s
decisions about what to believe and their ability to
report the source of their belief. Cognitive Development,
15, 329 – 346.
Trust in Previously Inaccurate Informants 27
